Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
10-1-1996

Risky Business
Michael S. Baram
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Labor and
Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Author is missing an Orcid ID

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

SDheres of Influence

RISK
What is to be done about
chronic health risks posed by
human exposure to hazardous
substances? How can finite
resources be used to assess these
risks, set priorities, enact standards, apply incentives, monitor
regulatory performance, and
achieve a coherent national
approach to risk management? How
do we make this enterprise effective,
efficient, equitable, and science-based, yet
fully responsive to people's concerns and
the special needs of vulnerable groups?
These are some of the tough issues
addressed by the Congressionally authorized Commission on Risk Assessment and
Risk Management in its June 1996 draft
report. The 10-member commission was
charged by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 to investigate the policy implications and appropriate uses of risk assessment and risk management in regulatory
programs under various federal laws, with
an emphasis on preventing cancer and
other chronic human health effects that
may result from exposure to hazardous
substances. Since May 1994, the commission has deliberated, held hearings across
the United States, and sought input from a
wide range of experts and stakeholders. A
final version of the report, entitled Risk
Assessment and Risk Management in
Regulatory Decision-Making, will be provided to Congress, the President, and the public in October 1996.
Responses to the draft credit the commission for its earnest effort and its willingness to sketch out new policy directions, as
well as to take a clear stance on some highly controversial issues. But commission
findings, rationales, and recommendations
on several matters have been faulted by
various reviewers on grounds ranging from
lack of requisite expertise, to promoting
1 040

work also provides a systematic process for integrating public values, perceptions, ethics,
and other considerations into
risk management decisions. This
consistent with principles of pardemocracy and the need to
nmental health protection
well-being for sustainable

¢cessary scientitnc
aICe for implementation.
ana
The commission intends to respond to this
critical feedback in its final report, but
points proudly to a recent indicator of
Congressional favor with its work the
enactment in August 1996 of the Food
Quality Protection Act. "The new law
replaces the zero-risk Delaney clause with a
negligible risk approach, which accommodates special population subsectors, and the
commission's report promoting such an
approach was cited favorably in the legislative process," according to commission
chairman Gilbert Omenn, dean of the
School of Public Health at the University
of Washington.
New Risk Management Framework
The first major feature of the commission's
draft is its brief sketch of a new risk management framework that would address
each risk problem in its full environmental
and social context. The framework's main
purpose is set forth in the report as the
need to make more efficient use of limited
resources than the "chemical by chemical,
medium by medium, risk by risk strategy"
now employed by agencies in a "highly
fragmented and adversarial system of conflicting actions" because of "multiple, unrelated statutory requirements." The frame-

*framework comprises six stages,
dscribed by the commission.
Formulating the risk problem. This
should be done in a "comprehensive, mul-

timedia, public health context" with early
involvement of stakeholders and risk managers at federal, state, and local levels to
characterize the problem, risk management
goals, and objectives. The context of such
problems may be national or regional.
Within the chosen context, all sources of
the pollutant, all pathways of exposure (air,
water, food), and a host of sociocultural
and economic factors would be evaluated
in order to characterize the risk problem
for the next stage.
Analyzing the risks. This task is to be
done "primarily by scientists and risk
managers with input from stakeholders,"
combining factual and scientific considerations with subjective perceptions. Thus,
the risks characterized in the first stage
"would be treated both qualitatively and
quantitatively."
Defining the options. Options for managing risks by regulatory and nonregulatory
means, a process for estimating and comparing risk reductions, costs, and benefits
associated with each option, and relevant
cultural, ethical, political, and legal dimensions should be defined.
Making sound decisions. Decisions
should be made by choosing "the most feasible, effective, acceptable, and cost-effective approaches." A mechanism for conflict
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resolution should be used when needed,
but when consensus is not achieved, "the
responsible regulatory authority must
make its decision."
Taking actions to implement the decisions. Such actions should be taken by
public agencies, businesses, industries, and
private citizens, alone or in combination,
as appropriate.
Evaluating the effects of the actions
taken. Monitoring and surveillance, discussions with stakeholders, and analyses of
relationships between interventions and
trends in health or environmental indicators should be used to evaluate the effects
of the actions taken; problem definition
and actions will be rethought if necessary.
This step requires good baseline and surveillance information.
Following this simplistic sketch of six
complex procedures, the commission provides ambiguous guidance for using the
framework: "The proposed framework is
intended to be a guide for an approach or
thought process for risk management decision-making. It is unlikely that all aspects
of the framework would be required for
every problem and some might be inconsistent with certain statutory requirements.
Different levels of decision-making will
require different levels of analysis. Risk
managers should apply this process flexibly
to accommodate the needs of individual
circumstances." The commission further
notes that "full implementation will lead to
a need for Congressional authorization and
funding; however, much progress can be
made with existing statutes."
According to Omenn, the framework
"represents a public health approach that
cuts through the polarized debate of the
last 20 years, providing a risk management
approach to public and environmental
health risks that is sensitive to susceptible
subpopulations and the real costs of compliance. It is logical, based on the views of
many people, puts risk problems in their
full context, and provides for true two-way
risk communication with stakeholders."
Commission member Bernard
Goldstein, director of the Environmental
and Occupational Health Sciences
Institute at Rutgers University, adds, "the
framework is intended to move risk management beyond the Beltway to state and
local levels, and enhance a regional
approach to risk. Stakeholders at the local
community level will provide useful information and be involved in framing the
issues and responses. The models of community risk now being relied on are inaccurate. We should use our best tools to
estimate risks more accurately and respond
to local concerns. These tools include bio-

markers and biomonitoring using, for
example, human tissue and fluid samples
to determine exposure and early effects.
The framework also calls for an evaluation
function to be built into every regulatory
program-an important function not
being done at the present."
One supporter of the new framework is
the American Industrial Health Council
(AIHC), a broad-based industry association. In comments on the draft report, the
AIHC endorses the iterative feature of the
framework: "Maintaining the option,
when circumstances justify, to reiterate the
entire cycle . . . is a logical plan by which
to assure that more effective and efficient
decisions are made, and less effective/efficient ones are identified."
Adam Finkel, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration's director of
health standards, agrees that it makes sense
to look at exposures and risks in context,
but expresses concern that "using framework procedures to prioritize risks could
result in neglecting other important risks
[that] would be relatively easy to control."
Finkel adds a larger concern that "the
framework and the report promote a public health approach, shaped by economic
efficiency considerations, to deal with population and subpopulation risks in various
contexts. This approach could displace
current efforts to use a balanced approach
for finding appropriate solutions to individual risks."
Additional reservations have been
expressed by Robin Cantor, program director for decision, risk, and management sciences at the National Science Foundation.
Cantor, a member of a risk assessment subcommittee of the National Science and
Technology Council, characterizes the
report and its framework as "reflecting
good intentions but leaping to recommen-

for the new framework as an improvement
over current practices, probably because
commission members were not sufficiently
familiar with current efforts and practices
by federal agencies in the areas of risk
assessment and risk management.
Reviewers of the report also find that
the framework proposal neglects some
obvious institutional and policy issues. For
example, existing laws are quite prescriptive and would obstruct implementation of
the proposed approach since agency
authority is limited to statutory mandate.
Thus, major Congressional reforms and
intricate interagency cooperation would be
needed for full implementation. Then
there is the considerable problem of defining risk contexts and dealing with the foreseeable conflicts over context boundaries.
Related to this problem is another issue:
whether states and communities have the
will, resources, and expertise to carry out
their proposed roles.
Another problem is how to ensure that
the same risk decisions are made in each of
several contexts for the same risk problem;
differential outcomes could serve as incentives for industry to relocate to the more
permissive contexts, causing economic and
social dislocations. And there is the considerable task of creating the new institutional
arrangements, infrastructures, and enforcement mechanisms that would be needed for
regional risk contexts. This could easily
become a costly, time-consuming, and even
impossible task. Thus, each proposed solution leads to a multiplicity of new problems. The final report may address some of
these questions.

Risk Assessment
The second major feature of the draft
report is its analysis and recommendations
on the use of risk assessment in regulatory

THE FRAMEWORK'S MAIN PURPOSE IS THE NEED
TO MAKE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF LIMITED
RESOURCES THAN THE "CHEMICAL BY CHEMICAL, MEDIUM BY MEDIUM, RISK BY
RISK STRATEGY."-RISK COMMISION REPORT
dations, attempting to capture a lot of the
thinking about risk management of the last
15 years without adequate treatment of the
social science issues involved, and calling
for panaceas such as stakeholder involvement and biomonitoring without seriously
addressing the issues these [suggestions]
raise." Others have voiced the comment
that the report fails to provide justification
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decision-making. This chapter addresses
toxicity assessment, exposure assessment,
uncertainties in risk estimation and reduction, chemical mixtures, ecological risk
assessment, and radiation and microbial
risk assessments.
The section on toxicity assessment is
most notable for its implications and controversial recommendations. In it, the
1041
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commission reports that chemicals suspected of causing cancer are regulated by
assuming that every exposure has some
risk, but that chemicals suspected of causing other effects, such as developmental or
reproductive toxicity, are regulated by
assuming that there is a safe level of exposure. The report asserts that this "simple

tion in the draft report, Omenn and
Goldstein indicate that they support present agency approaches, but want agencies
to begin exploring the MOE approach.
They point to the EPA's newly proposed
guidelines for carcinogens with nonlinear
dose-response characteristics, which adopt
the MOE approach; the suitability of

WE SHOULD USE OUR BEST TOOLS TO ESTIMATE
RISKS MORE ACCURATELY AND RESPOND TO
LOCAL CONCERNS.-BERNARD GOLDSTEIN
dichotomy is not fully supportable by current scientific evidence," and leads to noncomparable risk assessments and "striking
discrepancies among maximal exposures
considered to have negligible risk." The
discrepancies confound efforts in the areas
of comparative risk assessment, risk characterization, and risk communication.
Based on these findings, the commission recommends a consistent margin of
exposure (MOE) approach to both categories of chemical risks-chemicals that
are proven or suspected of being carcinogens and chemicals that are known or suspected of causing other noncancer effects
such as reproductive or neurological toxicity-with the MOE being the ratio of the
chemical exposure scientifically predicted
to cause a harmful health effect divided by
the current actual (or anticipated) human
exposure to that chemical. The risk manager, armed with the MOE, would then
decide whether the particular ratio provides an appropriate level of protection
and, the commission adds, "stakeholders
can make their own judgments."
Multiple benefits would arise from
using MOEs, according to the commission. It would lessen reliance on low
dose-response models, which are based on
little data and heroic assumptions. It
would also illuminate and make transparent the dichotomy between science and
values in choosing a level of protection. It
would enhance risk communication on
cancer risks that have been heretofore
"expressed in a manner that implies an
unwarranted degree of precision," as well
as stimulate greater emphasis on noncarcinogens. Finally, it would make it easier
to compare cancer risks to noncancer risks
for making risk management decisions.
Citing the urgent need to override the
default assumptions used to estimate small
risks, the commission is hopeful that biologic markers of early effects will provide a
better basis for relating animal and human
responses at low doses.
Although prescribed as a recommenda1 042

MOEs for risk-managing hazardous air
pollutants; and MOE potential for providing a common metric that would enhance
risk communication and risk comparison.
Finkel contends, however, that "[an]
MOE is merely a descriptive statistical presentation or packaging, not a true risk
management criterion of scientific value,
and runs counter to the views and methods
of the scientific community. We have the
ability to extrapolate to low exposure levels
and estimate carcinogenic risk, and scientists have become more comfortable about
doing this. Why use MOE, a lowest common denominator or reductionist
approach, which would discard or devalue
years of experience in carcinogenic lowdose risk assessment and replace it with the
less advanced principles of noncarcinogenic
low-dose risk assessment? Why not try to
make the less-good better? Furthermore,
MOEs are of dubious value for meaningful
risk communication, for advancing stakeholder understanding. Indeed, they are
quite manipulatable and could mislead
stakeholders."
Ronald Melnick, an NIEHS toxicologist
currently serving as the institute's representative to the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, concurs with Finkel's
assessment, and questions whether, "as a statistical presentation designed to facilitate
risk communication," the discussion of
MOEs would be more appropriate in the
report's section on risk communication. At
the same time, he asserts that the MOE
does not improve risk communication.
"The MOE for a potent carcinogen may be
small," says Melnick, "but large for a weak
carcinogen. How does this improve stakeholder understanding?" Melnick asks, "If a
common metric of scientific value is being
sought, why not recommend a common
approach based on biological mechanisms
of action; in other words, use a linear
dose-response approach for carcinogens and
noncarcinogens when research indicates linear response and, similarly, use a threshold
approach for both when this is scientifically

supportable." Melnick is concerned that
"the fixation on specific points in an MOE,
such as the 'no observable effects level'
(NOEL) used in the ratio, prevents capture
of experimental data on dose-response relationships and causes loss of important information on low-dose risk."
Frank Mirer, director of health and
safety at the United Auto Workers, worries
about the report's focus on noncancer endpoints. "The report expresses concern that
too much is being done to address carcinogens and not enough about other risks. But
instead of calling for more emphasis on the
other risks, it proposes that less be done on
carcinogens. It undermines what's been
done without putting forth a constructive
alternative."
Similar controversy has arisen over
another recommendation in the report that
certain rodent bioassays indicating rodent
cancer responses "be classified as irrelevant
to human cancer risk assessment" when
testing indicates that the chemical involved
produces "only tumors that occur as a
result of mechanisms or doses that would
have been deemed not relevant to
humans." This recommendation also calls
for agencies to develop consistent criteria
for making such findings, and appends a
table of "rodent tumor mechanisms not
likely to be relevant to human cancer risk if
they are the only responses observed and
are due to the mechanisms listed." The
table lists several sites of rodent tumors, the
mechanisms for such tumors in rodents
that are not likely to be relevant to human
cancer risk, and the chemicals implicated
in causing tumors by such mechanisms.
Comments on this part of the report
and its table have been critical, and
Omenn indicates that it will be revised in
the final report. UAW comments object to
such recommendations on toxicity assessment, calling them a form of "super rulemaking without an adequate record of data
considered." The UAW also says that the
chapter's "sweeping statements" will distort
agency actions, and objects "most notably"
to the commission's discounting of lung
tumors based on the overwhelming clearance mechanisms. "The database related to
this issue is vast, involving both laboratory
and epidemiology studies of substances
ranging from cigarette smoke, coke oven
emissions, asbestos, silica, talc, carbon
black, diesel particulate, and others," reads
the UAW commentary. "The hypothesis
that lung tumors arise from overwhelming
clearance mechanisms is vague, changeable
depending on context and interest.
Whatever version of this hypothesis is
being proposed ... is not stated and therefore can't be responded tO."
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Melnick believes that "the commission
jumped too quickly to eliminate rodent
tumor responses for lack of human relevance. What's needed is a scientifically
principled guidance instead of the table,
which contains inaccuracies. For example,
several of the entries can't be justified as
the only responses observed due to the
mechanisms listed, and the so called mechanisms are really chemical exposure effects,
not mechanisms from a biologic viewpoint.
Agencies need more in-depth, scientific
evaluation and are unlikely to rely on such
a table for risk regulation purposes."
Melnick adds the further criticism that
while the report focuses solely on how
mechanistic data may be used to downgrade the results of animal experiments, it
fails to acknowledge that such data can be
used to identify chemicals as potentially
carcinogenic to humans even in the
absence of tumor data, to establish risk,
and identify sensitive subpopulations.
Among other recommendations on
using risk assessment, the commission suggests replacing reliance on the hypothetical
maximally exposed individual with "a maximally exposed actual person and estimates
of the total number of potentially exposed
people in the geographical areas of interest," or, alternatively, with the EPA's "highend exposure estimate" approach. It also
recommends that risk assessments include
consideration of genetic and other host differences in susceptibility and identify especially susceptible human subpopulations for
specific chemical exposures, as well as particular groups of people who are likely to
have higher exposures to the chemicals.
As for uncertainty in estimating risk
due to gaps in information about scientifically observable phenomena, the commission finds that "quantitative approaches to
uncertainty analysis are complex, difficult
to perform, difficult to understand, and
often unnecessary." It consequently recommends that "qualitative descriptions of the
primary sources of uncertainty . . . be
included in risk characterizations intended
for risk managers and the nontechnical
public ... with formal quantitative analysis
not needed in most risk assessments."
Some reviewers of the report have taken
issue with this section because although it
discusses types of information the commission feels may be ignored, it fails to provide guidance for strengthening the scientific basis for risk assessments. Others have
countered though that the commission
may believe that the report's emphasis on
scientific judgment and peer-review adequately address such concerns.
The commission also grapples with risk
assessment of chemical mixtures such as

Environmental Health Perspectives

*

diesel exhaust. It finds that most risk assessments focus on individual chemicals in a
particular multichemical exposure context,
and simply add them together to estimate
risk related to the entire mixture, ignoring
synergistic or antagonistic interactions that
could underestimate or overestimate total
risk. To remedy this situation, the report
recommends toxicity testing of such mixtures, with risk adding to be done only
when mixtures involve multiple chemical
exposures at low concentrations, and information on the mechanisms is either lacking
or indicates that the same mechanism of
action is involved for each chemical in the
mixture. The AIHC emphatically supports
this recommendation.
The commission then hurries through
the terra incognita of ecological risk assessment by endorsing the EPA's framework
for evaluating ecological risk, pausing only
to call for interagency collaboration on
standardization by developing "clear guidance," and the addition of stakeholder
involvement. The AIHC has registered its
disappointment that the "report does not
engage in a robust and comprehensive discussion" of this subject. Because "ecological risk assessment deserves more evaluation and discussion," the AIHC offers
some recommendations. For example, the
commission should recommend the development of guidance on how to conduct a
tiered, iterative approach, and should
emphasize that a risk management decision
is never final or complete.
George Lucier, director of the
Environmental Toxicology Program at the
NIEHS, assesses the treatment of ecological risk assessment by the commission as
"very superficial, probably because of a lack
of ecological experts on the commission."
He adds that "the point needs to be made
that, although human health and ecologi-

Economic Analysis
A third major feature of the draft report is
the use and limitations of economic analysis in regulatory decisionmaking, a subject
The commission was not explicitly mandated to address. Finding that full quantification in dollar values is difficult, if not
impossible, and that there is concern that
regulatory decisions about health and environmental protection might be made strictly on a monetized, cost-benefit basis, the
commission takes a mainstream position.
Its recommendation, which Omenn
describes as "fitting squarely within the
positions of the last five administrations, as
expressed in their Executive Orders," calls
for recognition that the tools of economic
analysis provide "legitimate and useful
ways to obtain information for the risk
management framework and regulatory
decisions ... but not as the sole or overriding determinant of those regulatory decisions." In addition, the report states that
"costs and benefits that cannot be assigned
monetary values should be addressed and
considered explicitly . . . [and that]
assumptions should be specified." The text
amplifies this recommendation with a call
for supplementing cost-benefit analysis
with "information on its distributional
consequences," a point driven home in a
second recommendation that economic
analysis address any inequitable distributions of costs and benefits, albeit not necessarily in a quantitative fashion. The commission also calls for peer-review of any
economic analyses-a measure applauded
by many.
A special feature of the discussion is the
commission's comparative evaluation of
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA-used to
find the least costly method for achieving a
given goal) and cost-benefit analysis

MOES ARE OF DUBIOUS VALUE FOR MEANINGFUL RISK COMMUNICATION, FOR ADVANCING
STAKEHOLDER UNDERSTANDING. INDEED,
THEY ARE QUITE MANIPULATABLE AND COULD

MISLEAD

STAKEHOLDERS.-ADAM FINKEL

cal health have distinct features and problems, there is common ground. This common ground should be probed, not
ignored. For example, effects on wildlife
and ecological balance may provide harbingers of concern for people. Likewise, the
movement and fate of chemicals in the
environment may [be] essential tools for
estimating the magnitude and duration of
human exposure."

Volume 103, Number 10, October 1995

(CBA-used to help find the goal itself).
Noting that CEA has the advantage of not
requiring monetized benefits, The report
nevertheless faults this approach for its
inability to "inform the debate over the
goals of a policy," or deal with options that
produce differential benefits.
Of course, there is no way to address
the use of economic analysis in health and
environmental risk management contexts

1043
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without controversy. Certain statutes make
it impermissible to rely on a CBA
approach for setting standards, despite
Executive Orders and Office of Management and Budget procedures. Experience
has shown that the mainstream policy of
merely warning against conclusive use of
CBA in regulatory decision-making is
insufficient to prevent agency over-reliance
on arbitrarily monetized CBA in setting
standards. And, if the new framework pro-

report finds that the current use of quantitative estimates for small risks "convey[s]
an unwarranted sense of precision while
failing to convey the range of scientific
opinion." The report goes on to say that
such estimates are particularly difficult for
nontechnical audiences to comprehend,
especially when they reflect uncertainty.
Such characterizations may lead only to a
demand for more information.
Because of these findings, the commis-

WE HAVE TO DRAW LINES IN THE REAL WORLD.
WHEN WE CAN'T MEASURE RISK
LEVELS, OR SET RISK LEVELS CAPABLE OF
BEING MONITORED, WE SHOULD SET
CONTAMINANT

LEVELS.-GILBERT OMENN

motes stakeholder involvement and qualitative expressions of concern for characterizing risks and setting risk management
goals, and MOEs facilitate public selection
of levels of protection, the question
becomes whether CBA is really needed as a
goal-setting tool or, given the targets and
goals set by this process, whether CEA is
the more appropriate tool.
Concluding the section on economic
analysis, the commission recommends that
uncertainties be stated explicitly and quantified where appropriate, that results not be
expressed as precise measures of actual
costs and benefits, that federal guidelines
be developed for benefit valuation, and
that collaboration between risk assessors
and economists be improved in order to
minimize inconsistencies between their
respective approaches to characterizing and
reducing risks.

Risk Management and Regulation
The report's chapter on risk management
and regulatory decision-making summarizes methods for characterizing risk and
communicating it to stakeholders, comparing risk for various purposes, using bright
line rules to expedite risk management,
avoiding command and control regulatory
implementation, installing peer review,
and commenting on judicial review. In this
section, the comrnission finetunes its recommendations to assure that the report's
vision will be smoothly implemented.
At the outset, the commission returns
to the subject of risk characterization and
how to present risk assessment findings to
stakeholders, and reinforces the idea of
using an MOE approach to emphasize
nonprobabilistic expressions of risk. The
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sion recommends inclusion of qualitative
information on the nature of adverse
effects and the risk assessment itself in risk
characterizations, along with quantitative
estimates, the range of informed views, and
their evidentiary support. To prevent the
use of data gathering as a delaying or
obstructionist tactic, it also recommends
that criteria for acquiring additional information be set by all participants in the first
stage of managing a risk.
The report then discusses methods of
communicating risk information. Citing
various studies on risk communication
and perception, it finds that trust is a key
to effective communication and that
industry collaboration with community
groups, such as industry-supported citizen
advisory panels, is a particularly effective
way to build partnerships. A recommendation follows for regulatory agencies to
adopt "comprehensive risk communication programs that emphasize both the
learning and explaining activities of communication."
The report's rationale for adopting risk
communication programs is that the public should more readily accept risk characterizations and regulatory assessments.
This raises questions about the nature of
such risk communication: should it be
used to educate people about how to think
about risk, or should it be used to teach
people what to think about risk?
Cantor views the commission's treatment of risk communication, and subsequently of risk comparison, as inadequate.
"They present these subjects as panaceas
for many of the problems [that] afflict risk
management, but lacking expertise in the
social and behavioral sciences, and neglect-

ing a large body of research, they have
failed to address the many important issues
involved in appropriate use of such communications and comparisons. They simply did not address these subjects in a serious social scientific manner. For example,
economists assume consumer sovereignty
and individual choice in doing cost-benefit analysis, yet risk managers promote
institutional sovereignty when people
don't behave rationally. How should these
conflicting perspectives within the risk
management framework be resolved?"
Possibly the most controversial recommendation in this chapter is the commission's call for bright lines, or single point
estimates of risk to judge safety.
Acknowledging that bright lines have been
criticized as "magic numbers whose use is
inconsistent with knowledge about the distributions of risk and their inherent uncertainty" in a 1994 report by the National
Research Council, the commission nevertheless finds that bright lines can be useful
in guiding a decision process. The recommendation calls for the development of
bright lines to protect the general population and additional bright lines for especially susceptible subpopulations such as
young children, pregnant women, or
adults with particular diseases.
Permissible exposure levels, threshold
limit values, action levels for food contaminants, and National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for carbon monoxide and other
pollutants are cited as effective examples of
bright lines. According to the report, these
standards "provide assurance that risks will
be negligible as long as contaminant exposure concentrations are below the bright
lines," and provide a basis for consistent

decision-making.
The chapter does address some of the
problems associated with the use of bright
lines, including the fact that bright lines
could be misconstrued as indicating that
an exact boundary exists between safety
and risk. Bright lines could also be used
inflexibly in situations that call for recognition of the unique characteristics of a particular population. Another problem discussed is that point estimates do not reflect
any of the uncertainties and assumptions
involved in setting bright lines.
To avoid some of the risks of bright
lines, the recommendation cautions against
inflexible application, proposes multiple
bright lines for special population groups,
and asks Congress to leave the setting of
bright lines to federal agencies, as legislated
lines would be inflexible. The report also
advises the further precautions that bright
lines not be the sole determinants of deci-
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sion outcomes and that contaminant concentration bright lines are preferable to
bright lines expressed as risks because they
are easier to implement.
"We have to draw lines in the real
world," Omenn says. "When we can't measure risk levels, or set risk levels capable of
being monitored, we should set contaminant levels." Goldstein adds that bright lines
need not be drawn at a science-based de
minimis risk level and that the capability of
analytic methods or instrumentation will
determine the enforceability of a bright line.
The AIHC has expressed concern over
what it feels is significant confusion in the
report: that its discussion treats bright lines
as virtual standards for chemical concentrations, a use that would be inconsistent with
the procedures set forth earlier in the commission's new framework. The organization
urges the commission to clarify that bright
lines be used "only in screening analyses to
determine whether more detailed risk
assessment is required . . . [and that they]
not be construed to be the basis of standards in regulatory decision-making."
Others are also concerned about the
prospect that virtual standards in the form
of bright lines will emerge from agencies
outside of the normal administrative procedures for standard-setting. The UAW
objects to such "super rulemaking" aspects
of the report, and Melnick expresses concern that the combination of bright lines
and MOEs "will have the effect of masking
the complexities of risk characterization."

Recommendations for Specific
Agency Programs
The commission concludes the draft with
an uneven analysis of several agency programs. Little attention is given to some
major agencies with big risk management
problems. Indeed, the most environmentally troublesome, resource-consuming
agencies-the Departments of Energy and
Defense-receive the fullest endorsements.
The DOE is told only that its efforts "to
learn to assess and manage the entire environmental program from a risk perspective
should be continued and should be examined as a model for the EPA Superfund
program." Many question whether this is
adequate guidance for an agency whose
programs cover 130 facilities in over 30
states, including many contaminationplagued sites. The DOD, with the massive
job of dealing with some 28,000 potentially contaminated sites, receives only the recommendation that it "continue its efforts
to establish risk-based remediation priorities among its contaminated sites in collaboration with community advisory groups."

OSHA, with some of the most immediate and serious health risks and resource
constraints, receives a familiar message: to
work more closely with its research counterpart, National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health, so that its regulatory
needs are better served by NIOSH
research. But the commission also recommends that OSHA enact default guidelines
on several matters, including its methods
for assessing noncancer risks, for quantifying and expressing uncertainty and individual variability in risk, and for defining
negligible levels of individual risk for various adverse health effects. In comments to
the commission, the UAW calls these recommendations limited and disappointing.
More attention is given to the EPA's
water, pesticide, and Superfund programs.
For example, recommendations include
development of an "integrated watershedmanagement approach," and state watershed programs that provide for stakeholder
involvement. Such reforms are consistent
with the commission's new framework for
looking at risks in a regional context.
The centerpiece of the commission's
labors over agency programs is its proposal
for EPA implementation of Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act, which since 1990 has
provided that the agency enact maximum
available control technology (MACT) standards for point sources of hazardous air
pollutants. This technology-based
approach to the longstanding problem of
hazardous air pollutants will be supplemented with new EPA risk-based standards
for the residual risks that remain after
MACT standards are in place. As of May
1996, the EPA had enacted 27 MACT
standards, and had started work on identifying and estimating residual risks.
The commission's recommendations
focus on the residual risks and strive to create a risk management strategy that will
avoid "devoting extensive resources to pollution controls where there are no important risks." The main feature of the recommended strategy is use of a tiered scheme
to "characterize and articulate the scope of
the national, regional, and local air toxics
problems and their public health and environmental contexts; obtain necessary data
and perform screening risk assessments to
identify sources with the highest risks; conduct more detailed risk assessments of
sources and facilities with the highest risks;
evaluate risk reduction options at [such
facilities]; . . . and determine the need to
evaluate residual risks from less high-risk
source categories."
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Summary
In prior studies by high-level commissions,
emphasis was given to improving the scientific basis and institutional procedures for risk
assessment and risk regulation within existing
statutory frameworks. Recommendations
have led to slow but steady progress.
This study is considerably different. It
emphasizes a public health approach for efficient use of resources in a new flexible framework for risk management, reductionist
approaches to risk assessment and characterization, increased public involvement, and
various methods for managing such public
involvement. It provides a mix of aspirations
and concepts, procedures, and "shop floor
rules" for putting the new system of risk
management into practice.
Concerns remain, however, that bright
lines and other rules are at odds with the
report's professed aspirations for meaningful
public involvement; that ad hoc institutional
arrangements for putting each risk in a situational context may not be an efficient use
of public and private resources; that techniques for managing stakeholder involvement will be seen as manipulative and may
even increase public mistrust and anxieties
about risk; and that reductionism by the
regulatory clients of risk assessment could
diminish progress in the environmental
health sciences.
Says Lucier, "The goal of risk assessment
should be to prevent environmentally or
occupationally mediated diseases or injury.
This point is not made sufficiently clear in
the commission's report. Nevertheless, the
report does an admirable job of attempting
to merge science, common sense, public perception, public health, economics, and stakeholder interests into a regulatory policy strategy." He continues, "The merging of these
diverse inputs will never be easy and should
never be overly prescriptive. The complete
integration of all relevant information into
the risk assessment and risk management
process will require greater reliance on expert
judgment to make decisions that are timely,
that are based on appropriate peer review,
that are consistent with public health priorities, that do not create unnecessary regulatory
burdens, and that are understandable by the
public."
The commission's report provides an
alternative vision of risk management that
incorporates popular political and social
trends. Thorough evaluation of the report's
recommendations will, at the very least, focus
scrutiny on current risk assessment and risk
management practices and perhaps produce
better solutions.

Michael Baram
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